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STATEMENT OF IURISDICFION
4'he Supreme Court has appellate jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to
L'tah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3 yai. Rule 5 1. LTah R. App. P., and Order of tins (ourt
dated November 29, 2006.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
1. Did Appellees, by tame; a personal injury suit and placing the physical
condition of Nicholas Sorensen at issue, waive the physician-patient duty oi
confidentiality thereby permitting exparte communications between Dr. Rarbuto, a
prior treating physician, and the defendant's counsel in the personal injury litigation?
Standard <>f review: "4'he issue of whether a duty exists is entireh' a qtiestion of law
to be determined by the court7' Smitlvy. Erandsui, 2004 UT ?)T), t]. 14, 94
T.5d 919, 925-924.
Preservation: This issue was preserved at the trial court and addressed by the Court
of Appeals in ScMxiysyai.x-TLirbut.). 2006 UT App 340, 143 P.3d 295.
2. Did the Court of Appeals err in its application i)\ Rule 506, Utah
R. Evid. anel I 'tab Code Ann. § 78-24-814..i in ruling that neither provision
mod: tied the physician-patient eiutv <T confidentiality?
M^lddr.d ot.Review: Proper interpretation and application of a statute is a qtiestion
ot law reviewed lor correctness with no deference aiforded to the lower court's lciyd
conclusions. State v. One Lor of Pers. Prop.. 2004 UT 36, 'i 8. 90 P.3d 659, 641.
Preservation: "Phis issue was preserved at the trial court and addressed by the Court
of Appeals in Soxcjjsen yTUrjyuto. 2006 I "T App 340, 143 P.5d 295.
PROVISIONS OFTCONSFITUa ION, STATUTES,
ordinAn^esvvnd RULES
Utah Code Ann. sS 78-24-12(4) (emphasis added):
A physician or surgeon cannot, without the consent of his
patient, be examined in a civil action as to any information
acquired in attending the patient which was necessary to enable
him to prescribe or act tor the patient. However, this privilege
shall be deemed to be waived by the patient in an action in which
the patient places his medical condition at issue as an element or
factor of his claim or defense. Under those circumstances, a
physician or surgeon who has prescribed for or rrearcd_jh.it
j7ifieiiJ_J__>r_the ir_edical condition at issiicjiiay_pre)vi<.1e
mfonnanymi. interviews, reports^ records^ statements^
memoranda, or other data relating to i-yc patfc^nfsjncdical
condition and treatment which are plated atissue.
Rule 506, Utah Rules of Evidence (relevant portions):
(b) (lenem! vale ofprivilege. If the information is communicated
in confidence and tor the purpose of diagnosing or treating the
patient, a xuient has a privilege, during the patient's life, to
retu.se to c iselose A\n\ to prevent any other person from
disclosing (1) di aynoses made, treatment provided, or ad\ ice
given, by a physician or mental health therapist, (2) information
obtained by examination of the patient, and (3) information
transmitted among a patient, a physician or mental health
therapist, ,\\k\ persons who are participating in the diagnosis or
treatment under the direction of the physician or mental health
therapist, including guardians or members of the patient's family
who are present to lurther the interest of the patient because they
a\x reasonably necessary for the transmission of the
communications, or participation in the diagnosis and treatment
tinder the direction of the physician or mental health therapist.
(d) Exceptions. No privilege exists under this rule:
(d)( 1) Condition as element ofclmm or defense. As to a
communication relevant to an issue of the physical, mental, or
emotional condition of the patient in any proceeding in which
that condition is ;m element of anv claim or defense' or, alter the
patient's deatly in any proceedings in which any party relies upon
the condition as L\n element of the claim or defense.
state:m en rr o f t h e case
A. NATURE OF THE CASE
'Phis is ,\n action against [ohn P. Barbuto, M.D. UDr. Barbuto"), a prior
treating ph\'sician of plaintitT Nicholas Sorenscn ("Nicholas"). In their complaint,
plaintiffs (collectively the "Sorensens"} allege breach of contract and \ariou.s tort
cau.scs of action based upon Dr. Rarhuto's participation with detense counsel in a
separate personal injury action. 4'he Sorensens base their claims on alleged breach ot
confidentiality and allegedly false or incorrect information provided by Dr. Barbuto
to defense counsel.
B. COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS
After evaluation of the complaint ,\nd before answering. Dr. Barbuto sought
dismissal of the complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6y Utah R. Civ. 17 tor tailurc to
state a legally cognizable claim for relief. After written ,md oral arguments, the trial
court ruled in Dr. Rarhuto's favor, dismissing the complaint. 'The Sorensens
appealed that decision to this Court which, pursuant to I 'tab ("ode Ann. $ "8-2-2(4)
transferred the appeal to the Court of Appeals.
4'hc Court ot Appeals affirmed in part and reversed in part. In its affirmation,
the ^nvnx held that the Sorensens tailed to state claims for breach of implied contract
and invasion of privacy. It also held that D\\ Barbuto's deposition testimony was
protected bv judicial privilege. 4'hc court reversed the trial court decision in part
holding that Dr. Barbuto's ex parte communications with defense counsel breached a
aiduciarv duty ot confidential it vd1 that the breach of confidentiality was sufficient to
state a claim tor intentional infliction of emotional distress, and that the privilege
provisions <it' Rule 506 did not protect \^v. Barbuto from the tort claim.
C. STATEMENT OF FACTS
Nicholas was injured in an automobile rollover accident on July 24, 1909.
(R. 2 11 57} Beginning on or about that date and continuing tor approximately one
,\nd one-halt years. Dr. Barbuto provided medical care to Nicholas. (R. 2 "i 6.; At
that time. Dv. Barluito ceased being a listed provider under the Sorensens' insurance
plan and Michael Ooldstcin, M.D. assumed the duty to treat Nicholas. (Id.)
Nicholas subsequently commenced peisonal injury litigation based upon his
injuries in the accident. (R. 2 '1 7.) Nicholas prevailed in that action. (Id.) Prior to
trial, Nicholas's medical records, including tin >se in the possession of Dr. Barbuto,
were produced during discovery.
In May 2003, the detense counsel in the personal injury case subpoenaed
Dr. Barbuto to testily at trial which was set to begin later in the month. (R. 3 11 8.)
4'hc trial was subsequently postponed until October 2003 and, during the interim
period, Dr. Barbuto communicated expicric with defense counsel. (R. 3 'HI 8-9.)
Dr. Barbuto was subsequently retained by defense counsel to review' all the medical
records produced during discovery, including those documenting Nicholas's
symptoms and treatment after Dr. Barbuto's treanncnt ended, M\d to otter expert
op nions at trial on the cause of Nicholas's symptoms.
Ultimately, Nicholas had \)v. Barbuto excluded from testifying as ,in expert at
trial, because he had been untimely designated as an expert witness. (R. 4 '! 11.)
Because of Dr. Barbuto's association with the defense counsel in the personal injury
action, the Sorensens commenced action against him.
S U \ IM A RY p FA RG U ME N T
Ihe Court ot Appeals has created a common law fiduciary duty of physician
confidentiality which undermines this ('ourt's authority to establish rules re<->ardin<>
privilege and is inconsistent" wt:h the legislature's regulation ot the practice ot
medicine. In doinu, so, it has separated two integral concents, confidentiality and
privilege, both of which arise from the phvsician-patient relationship and differ only
by semantic distinctions. By making the duty of confidentiality a "fiduciary'' one,
the Court of Appeals has imposed expectations bevond tliose normally attached to
the phvsician-patient relationship, dramatically expanding the scope of a physician's
da it v. Additionally, the ('ourt of Appeals pronouncement of a new common law
dutv is held to apply expost facto to Dr. Barbuto.
There is no question that a physician owes his patient a duty ot confidentiality
which survives termination of the phvsician-patient relationship. The issue before
this ( aiurr is whether that duty ot confidentiality continues where the patient places
his or her physical condition at issue in litigation in light of this Court's
pronouncement in Rule 506, Utah R. Fvid. that no privilege exists under this
circumstance. More specific to this case is whether the Sorcnsons" complaint even
states a claim for relief where i 1i Dr. Barbuto's records regarding Nicholas had
already been made part of the litigation record bv way of discovery, and (2)
l)v. Barbuto's exparte communications with defense counsel in the personal injury
matter related to medical records made bv other physicians alter Dr. Barbuto had
ceased to act as Nicholas's physician .\\\d which had also been disclosed as part ot the
personal injure ease.
4'hc fiduciary duty created by the ('ourt of Appeals would preclude a treating
physician without prior approval from his past patient from ever discussing the
patient's treatment or records with ambociw not only defense counsel, despite the
absence of a privilege under Rule 506.' 4"he duty pronounced by the Court of
The irony in this case is that had Dr. Barbuto's observations avA comments
been more supportive ot Nicholas's personal injury claims, the Sorcnsons would
Appeals, however, is in direct conflict with the legislative determination that a
physician is free to discuss a patient's condition where the patient has placed that
condition at issue in litigation. More fundamentally, the Court of Appeals creation
ot this duty is implicitly based upon a semaniic distinction between the physician
duty of confidentiality and the phvsician-patient privilege. 4'hc court, however, fails
t( >identify that distinction or to explain why it exists. In reality, the two concepts
are the same, especially under circumstances where the patient places his medical
condition at issue in litigation. Separating them by common law judicial fiat
miroduces contusion and unpredictability into an area of Taw that is clearK' defined
by statute and/or court rules.
By loosely using the term "fiduciary," the Court of Appeals has injected two
otner elements into what is otherw ise a settled area of law. T'irst, it has minted new
common law for the State of Utah which will require additional future litigation to
define its scope ,\nd applicability. Secondly, by lax use ol'a term of art, it has
imposed upon a physician a duty to say nothing which could be viewed as
dcrimcntal to the litigation interests of a patient or former patient. While some
courts from some other jurisdictions have used the lerm "fiduciary" in describing a
physician's duty, their analysis and holdings expressly limit the scope of that duty to
the realm ot providing patient diagnosis and treatment. .Adding the term "fiduciary"
to the duty of patient confidentiality adds no clarification to that duty and acts only
to broaden the potential scope of the duty beyond the reasonable expectations of the
physician or patient and to the potential detriment of the search for truth in the
litigation process.
icver have objected. It seems patently obvious that it is not Dr. Barbuto's ex parte
'onvcrsation, but rather the content of his opinions that is driving their le^al actioi
The ('< niiT of Appeals' ruling also da)es not deal with the scope of the
pb.vsician-patient privilege as defined in other appellate court holdings. In fact,
scope is not ,\n issue in this ease; all of the medical records regarding Nicholas had
already been produced during discovery prior to the expane communications
complained of here.' It is clear, therefore, that there was no impermissible disclosure
of"confidential communications. "The real issue is that Dr. Barbuto opined about the
causes of Nicholas's symptoms in a way that was not supportive ot has claims in the
lit Ration. It is the e\prcssi< >n of those medical opinions for wInch the Sorensens
seek to punish l^w Barbuto. This is inconsistent with this Court's approach to the
privilege issue. 4'he bottom line is that privilege must give way to the search tor
truth. 47) the extent that the Court of Appeals' newly created fiduciary duty
discourages that open search for truth, it undermines the level field ot litigation m
favor (it' the plaintiit/patient.
It is important tor this Court to address the new fiduciary durv of
confidentiality created by the Court of Appeals. 4'he procedural rules of litigation
should be predictable and uniformly applied to all parties. 4'he ('ourt ot Appeals1
decision undermines this uniformity and predictability. Under the current state of
the law. it is tiuelear whether a treating pinsieian caw ever without a patient's prior
consent, discuss a patient's condition with anybody other than the patient or the
patient's lawyer. May a physician as a "fiduciary" testily honestly about his opinions
regarding the cause of a patient's symptoms, or must he first clear his opinion with
the patient and testify only it his patient is satisfied with the content of his
prospective testimony And "permits" the physician to testify?
If this Court deemed it appropriate to limit ex parte communications or the
scope ot continued privilege under Rule 306, that could be accomplished bv
amendment to the rule. However, as discussed below, limiting a phxsician's ability
:o discuss a patient's records mav be an infringement on legislative prerogative.
4'he ( ourt oi Appeals' \mc\v common law duty is also inconsistent with its
prior rulings and those ot this Court on phvsician-patient privilege. This new duty
and its application undermine this Court's determination of the extent of the
privilege under Rule 306. 44ns new duty, as applied here to exparte
communications, is also in direct conflict with the legislature's regulation of
plwsician practice. In addition, bv making the new duty a fiduciary one, it invites
future litigation to define the scope of that fiduciary duty. It is thcivfore appropriate
for this ('ourt to reverse the Court of Appeals ruling and affirm the trial court's
dismissal of the complaint for failure to state a claim for relief.
ARGUMENT
I. THE COURT OF APPEALS' CREATION OF A NEW DUTY OF
CONFIDENTIALITY INFRINGES ON THIS COURTS RULE
MAKING AUTHORITY AND IS FACIALLY INCONSISTENT
WITH THE LEGISLATIVE REGULATION OF PHYSICIAN
PRACTICE.
While the duty of confidentiality, in norma! circumstances, extends beyond
the termination of the physician-patient relationship, the confidentiality' of patient
information is not absolute. See State v. Carclall, 1999 ITT 5 1, II 29, 982 P.2d 79,
85 (holding privilege tinder Rule S06, Utah R. Hvid. is not absolute). 4'hc
Complaint establishes that Nicholas initiated the personal injury litigation based
upon his physical injuries. (R. 2, *\ 7.) 4'he ( omplaint also establishes that
Dr Barbuto's records regarding his care for Nicholas were part of'the evidence in
that case. (R. 3, ^1 87 d'he Utah Rules of Evidence specifically provide that no
privilege exists when physical condition is plated at issue in litigation.
No privilege exists under this rule:
. . . As to communication relevant to m\ issue of physical, mental
or emotional condition of the patient in any proceeding in which
that condition is an clement of any claim or defense . . .
Rule 5061 d :: 1 '. I 'tab R. E\ id.' Utah statute yoes bevond this proclamation <if' no
privilege to expressly permit a treating, physician to discuss the patient's records;
A plwsician or surgeon cannot, without the consent of his
patient, be examined in a civil action as to any information
acquired m attending the patient which was necessary to enable
him to prescribe or act for the patient. However, tins privilege
shall be deemed to be waived by the patient in An action in which
the patient places his medical condition at issue as an clement or
factor of his claim or defense. Under those circumstances, a
physician or surgeon who has prescribed for or treated that
patient for the medical condition at issue may pro\ idc
information, interviews, reports, records, statements,
memoranda, or other data relatine to the patient's medical
condition and treatment which are placed at issue.
Utah ('ode Ann. § 78-28-8(4; (emphasis added). This is precisely what Dr. Barbuto
did m Nicholas's personal in]tin* action. In addition, however, he also re\ iewed and
evaluated other medical records, an activity for which there is no dun1 of
confidentiality. It is apparently this review of other records for defense counsel
which stirred the animosity of the plaintiffs' bar, giving rise to this action."
The Court ot Appeals observed that Rule 506 supersedes § 78-24-8i4).
Sorenscn v. Byuiyuto, 2006 IT App 340, «' 12, 143 P.3d 295, 299. The problem
with that observation is that the court :'efused to address the issue presented hv
Dr. Barbuto, i.e., does Rule 5061 4) expressly or implicitly overrule the legislative
'The Utah rule does not. as in some states and in the replaced statutory
privilege m 7 78-24-8(4), create a waiver of the phvsician-patient privilege. Because
the rule simply eliminates the privilege, issues regarding waiver and scope of the
waiver don't apply under Rule 506.
'Counsel for the Sorensens stress in the Complaint and vehemently reiterated
m argument before the trial court and the Court of Appeals historical conduct on the
part with Dr. Barbuto that the "plaintiffs' bar" finds offensive. 44ic "facts" related to
Dr. Barbuto's involvement with defense attorneys are advanced in the Complaint
i. R. 4-5, V; 12-13), the hearing transcript [i\ 8:15 through 10:5 y And the
Appellant's Brief to the Court ofAppeals iApIt's Brf. Pp. 5-7). None ot'those
al egations have any bearing on the sufficiency of the complaint, but do illustrate that
more is involved here than the establishment of a duty to protect patients in
huiiation.
determination as to what a plwsician may do under the last sentence in
§ 78-24-8(4)? Without discussing the issue, the ('ourt of Appeals assumed this to
be the case. I lowcvcr, no Utah appellate court has ever addressed the issue. 4'he
conclusory approach used by the Court of Appeals ignores the fundamental
distinctions between the two portions of the statute. 4'he first two sentences deal
with the phvsician-paticnt privilege. 4'he last statement instructs physicians on what
thev may do when the privilege ceases to protect patient confidentiality. 4'he
legislature has never repealed § 78-24-8(4) and this Court lias never declared the last-
provision to be invalid.:>
4"his ( aiurr discussed a similar issue in Ryan v. Gold Cross Services, Inc..
T—* J 'S-•- ^
903 P.2d 425, 425 (l'tah 1995;. In a challenge to a statute as an infringement on
judicial rule making authority, the Ryan court explained that while this Court had
auvhority under .Article VIII, section 4 of the Constitution of I 'tah to create rules ot
evidence, the legislature retains authority over non-procedural substantive issues.
4'he scope of privilege is a rule of evidence over which the Supreme ('ourt has
control, subject to legislative review. 4'he issue of regulation of physician activities,
however, is a substantive one reserved to the legislature. 4'here is simple no
authority on which the Court of Appeals could conclude that this Court's
establishment of a rule of evidence can constitute a repeal of a legislative act dealing
with such substantive issues. 4'he Rvan analysis rejects any such conclusion.
a'he only way to make the Court of Appeals decision consistent with
§ / 8-24-8(4) is to judicially impose a restriction on ex parte interviews. As often
recognized by this Court, this interpretation is not consistent with the rules of
statutory construction. A "cardinal rule of statutory construction is that courts are
not to infer substantial terms into the text that are not already there. Rather, the
interpretation must be based on the language used, and the court has no power to
rewrite the statute to confirm to An intention not expressed." Berrcttyy Pirrscr &
hsbyards, 8/6 P.2d 36/, 3/0 (Utah 1994) (citations omitted i "
4'he Court of Appeals' holding also interferes with this Court's rule making
authority inasmuch as application of the duty created by that court brings into
question the viability and applicability of Rule 506 to the obligations arising from
the physician-patient relationship. If the elimination of the privilege under Rule 506
does not permit a physician to discuss anvthinu related to the patient's condition,
what pttrpose is served by Rule 506: There is no need to create a phvsician-patient
privilege it the duty ot confidentiality is separate from And encompasses that
privilege. 47icre is no purpose in removing the privilege for purposes of litigation it'
the dtitv ot confidentiality applies independently from the privilege rule and trumps
anv waiver created by placing physical condition at issue in the litigation.
Both the Sorensens and the Court ot Appeals placed considerable emphasis on
the Dr. Barbuto's exparte discussions with defense counsel. 44icre is, however, no
legal significance to the exparte nature of those discussions. 4'here is no restriction
in 7 "8-24-Si 4 i on the physician's "inten iews" or other activities. Before the ( auirt
of Appeals, Dr. Barbuto pointed out that the Utah State Bar, consistent with
Rule 506 and 7 78-24-8i4), had issued an ethical opinion prior to the events at issue
how stating that "|n|o rule prohibits aiiv exparte contact with plaintiffs treating
ph\s;cian when plaintiffs phvsieal condition is at issue." Utah State Bar Ethics
Advisory Opinion Committee Opinion No. 994)3 (copy enclosed as Addendum Bo'1
,kvO_7l Stempler v.__SpeijuVll. 405 A.2d 85" iN.J. 1985 ).
Apparently without examining the analysis in the ethics opinion, the Court of
Appeals concluded that it "addresses the responsibilities of attorneys, nor physicians.
Because the issue in this cast' concerns a physician's duty, the ethics opinion does not
4 he plaint ids' bar vigorously opposed this conclusion bet ore the ethics panel
and bar commissioners, but were unable to establish any legal authority for reaching
a ditterent conclusion.
apply." Sorcjysen, 2006 VV App *1 I6 n. 5. The conclusory nature ot this approach
ignores two things. T'irst, the ethics panel's inquiry into the exparte nature of the
discussions was very extensive And its analysis sound. Second, it is not good policy
to permit attorneys to instigate ex pnrtc disctissions with treating physicians And then
hold the physician liable for responding. Obviously, attorneys with a presumptive
knowledge of the law should not be permuted to lead plwsicians, lacking that legal
backgrotind, into violating a comnion law duly owed to the patient. The rule should
consistently apply to both. As it stood at the time of Dr. Barbuto's activities, there
was nothing in the law which would have placed him or any other plwsician on
notice that engaging in exparte discussions about a patient's medical condition at
issue in a personal injury lawsuit would expose him :o a tort claim.
Creating a common law "fiduciary" duty of confidentiality which is broader
than and different trom the physician-patient privilege as defined bv statute and/or
evdentiarv rule creates common law ambiguity where clear standards should apply.
It :here is to be a change in these rules, it is the prerogative of this Court to make
them under its rule making authority rather than leave their amendment to the
vagaries of a newly developing common law duty.
II. THE COURT OE APPEALS1 CREATION OE A FIDUCIARY DUTY
IS UNSUPPORTED BY UTAH LAW AND GOES WELL BEYOND
THE DUTIES ARISING FROM THE PHYSICIAN-PATIENT
RELATIONSHIP.
One of the significant concerns with the Court of Appeals" decision is nor only
that it creates a new duty of confidentiality which extends beyond the legal
o
termination of the physician-patient privilege, but it also makes the duty a fiduciary
one.
Consistent with the reasoning of Dcbn\ we hold that ex parte
communication between a physician and opposing counsel
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constitutes a breach of the physician's fiyjucjary duty of
11 mtident lalitv.
Sorenscn. 2006 U4' App * 16'. emphasis added i. Additionally, this f.ducrarv duty.
applies onlv to communications with counsel defending a partv sued bv the doctor's
prior patient. Pxparte communications with plaintiffs counsel ;s presumed to be
with the patient's consent. 4'he ('ourt of Appeals decision potentially imposes a duty
on a phvsician that favors testimony favorable to his patient ito whom a fiduciary
obligation is owed) over medically objective truth.
4'he fiduciary duty is "|a| duty to act for someone else's benefit, while
subordinating one's personal interests to that of the other person. It is the highest
standard of duty implied bv law. " Black'_s_I ^\_Dk'B()iyn7 TV25 (6th Ed.]990t. In
discussing fiduciary duty the Restatement of 4'orts notes that " [a] fiduciary relation
exists between two persons when one of them is under a duty to act for or to give
advice for the benefit of another upon matters within the scope of the relation."
Restatement (Second) of 4'orts § 874. Comment a. (citing Restatement LSecond)
Trusts § 2 i (emphasis added7 It is well-established that "[a| fiduciary duty is the
duty to act primarily for another's benefit." E.g., I laluka v. McRedmond v. Estate
of Mananelli, 46 S.W.3.d 750. "58 71'enn. App. 2000). Fiduciary relationships are
those in which the fundamental nature of the relationship between the parties
imposes a broad general dtitv to protect the welfare of the other partv, such as
atttirnev-client, Shaw Resources Ltd.. L.L.C. v. Prtiitt, Cushee cv Bachtclh B.C.,
2006 UT App 313, 142 P.3d 560, corporate directors, C & Y Corp. v. General
liio.ilIW.ics^Inc., 896 P.2d 47 (Utah App. 1995), partnerships, Ong Int'l iU.S.A.)
{.QC- v. 1lth Ave. Corp., 850 P.2d 447 iUtah 1993). Even so, some attorneys and
accountants may not owe fiduciary duties to a client, depending upon the actual
nature ot the relationship. I larmon Citv. Inc. v. Nielsen & Senior, 907 P.2d 1162,
1169 iUtah 1995). It is the nature of the relationship and the reasonable
expectations of the parties as they enter the relationship which dictates whether it is
or is not lidueiarv.
Implicit in the Court of Appeals' decision here is that a physician, bv wav of a
fiduciary duty, has the obligation to act only in the best interests, particularly the
financial interests of the patient. 4'he case law is replete with complaiir.s alleging
breach of fiduciary duty against physicians. As a rule, however, most cotirts which
have examined the issue ot a fiduciary duty in a phvsician-patient relationship have
declined to find a fiduciary duty beyond the duties which arise from and are based
upon that relationship. 4'bosc courts which have used the term "fiduciary" in
defining this physician's duty have restricted that duty to (1i competent evaluation
and treatment of a patient's condition, (2) a duty to disclose information material to
the patient's condition, (3) a duty to disclose adverse events, and (4) a duty of
confidentiality with respect to patient information. Only one court, that ca\i be
determined from research, has held that the physician-patient relationship imposes a
broad duty of 'Lgood faith and fair dealing" encompassing the duty to speak only for
the patient's financial or other benefit. Fan., Watts v. (dimhcrlaud County I lospital
System, Inc., 343 S.E.2d 879, 884 (N.C. 1986).'' Every other court has found only
a United fiduciary duty based upon reasonable- expectations of the physician and the
pa' ient, i.e., a duty to exercise appropriate skill, to advise the patient of all
information necessary and pertinent to a course of treatment, and to maintain
confidentiality. For example, in Wogan v. Kun/e, 623 S.E.2d 107, I 19
(7S.C. App. 2005) the court concluded that the breach of fiduciary duty claim was
related to a physician's duty to provide "treatment And care ... in a proper.
It is significant that the \\7t_tts case has not been cited or applied outside the
state of North Carolina. Apparently, North Carolina stands alone in this position.
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professional, ethical, competent and appropriate manner." Indeed, the court in
l\_(lg,in- expressly rejected a claim that a physician had a fidticiarv duty arising from
the phvsician-patient relationship that recuired him to assist his patient's economic
interests by helping him to tile a medicare claim. IeT
In Brandt v. Medical Defense Assoc.. 856 SAY.2d 667, 670 (Mo. 1995) ;en
banc i, discussed below, the court stated its belief that At physician has a fidticiarv
duty ot confidentiality not to disclose anv medical information received in
connection with his treatment of the patient." It then proceeded to limit the scope
of that dutv, essentially removing its fiduciary nature and holding that the dutv does
not app'v to exparte discussions where the patient's condition was at issue in
litigation. Id. at 670-71.
Michigan similarly recognizes a fiduciary duly arising from the physician-
patient relationship which is limited to the scope of medical care provided to the
patient. Burton v. William Beaumont Hospital, 373 F. Supp.2d 707, "23-24
(171). Mich. 2005). In Mclvuchcnko v.Jliv, 593 N.W.2d 589, 591 (Mich.
App. 1986), the court observed that the fiduciary relationship between plwsician And
patient is "founded on the proper diagnosis and treatment of medical problems."
The Mejychcnko court held that this limited fidticiarv dutv does not preclude a
treating plwsician from testifying for a defendant in a malpractice case. Li.
Other courts have similarly limited the scope of the "fiduciary" dutv owed bv
a physician. Wiseman v. AjTant H.o-spiraK, Inc., ?>7 SAV.-m! 709, 713 i Iw. 2000)
•;" 1he fiduciary relationship between the parties grants a patient the rig!it to relv on
the physician's knowledge and skill.":; Qaly v. Metropolitan Lite Ins. Co.. ~S2
N.Y.S.2d 350, 554 (N.Y. Stipp. 2004) (noting that the claim ot'breach of fidticiarv
dutv "in the context of physician-patient relationships, arises as a result of a
physician's unauthorized disclosure of a patient's confidential medical records.").
Reviewing Massachusetts law. the court in Korper v. Weinstein, 783 N7E.2d
H77 (Mass. App. 2003) discussed the scope and limits of fiduciary duties arising
from the phvsician-patient relationship.
4'he existence of the relationship in any particular case is to be
determined by the tacts established. In addition to the obvious
obligation to make medical decisions in the patient's best
interest, a physician has a fiduciary duty to maintain the
confidentiality ot a plaintiffs medical records. However, the
existence ot a fiduciary relationship docs not mean that all
interaction between the parties to that relationship is measured
by the standards applicable to fiduciaries; the fiduciary is held to
a higher standard of conduct only_as_to matters within the scope
of the fiduciary relationship. Even though the phvsician-patient
relationship is one of many familiar and well recognized forms of
fiduciary relationships, the scope of the fiduciary uiutv is defined
bvjhe incidents ancLundertiiking^ as_a
physician^ '
Id, at SShpunetuation, citations, footnotes omitted, emphasis added). 4'he ]\oj_jxt
court expressly refused to "expand the scope of the fiduciary duty a doctor owes a
patient to include conduct beyond the contcx: of medical treatment." Id. at n. 11.
Wliile it may arguably be appropriate to characterize the physician-patient
relationship as a fiduciary tine, it adds nothing to the duties arising from that
reluionship to refer to them as fiduciary. It is also inappropriate to impose upon
th.t relatiouslrp a duty to act solely for the benefit of the patient well after the
relationship has terminated. See In re Diet Drug-- Products Liability .1 LUgatHnj, ^^2
E. Supp.2d =,?>?>, 543 (E.D.Ta. 2004) (declining to tind a fiduciary duty where
physician-patient relationship no longer existed). 4'here is no cjuestion that a
physician has duties to provide competent care to the patient, to disclose all
medically pertinent information, and to maintain patient confidentiality. It is also
unquestionable that the duty to maintain confidentiality continues alter termination
ot the phvsician-patient relationship, unless otherwise terminated as a matter of law.
I he r:duciary dutv created bv the Court of'Appeals, however, potentially goes
hcvord the scope of providing confidential and competent treatment of the patient.
I he ('ourt ot Appeals1 introduction of'the word "fiduciary11 in defining the common
law dutv leaves physicians to wander and lawyers to argtie that a physician mav onlv
speak ot causation ot injuries it the opinion serves the financial interest of a patient
or former patient. It appears to permit the physician to confer wath attorneys for the
patient because that would be m the patient's financial interests. It prevents the
physician trom speaking with defense counsel because that might be adverse to the
patient's financial interests. Neither of these relates in any wav to the purpose for
which the phvsician-patient relationship was created; competent diagnosis and
treatment ot the patient's condition.
III. THE DUTY OF CONFIDENTIALITY AND THE PHYSICIAN-
PA TIEN T PRIVILEGE ARE IDENTICAL AND SHOULD BE
TREATED AS SUCH.
The duties owed by a doctor arise Trom the physician-patient relationship.
E,g., Pegalis and Wkichsman, American Law of Medical Malpractice i 19S0> § 2:3
at 45. See also Nixdorf v. Hickcn, 612 P.2d 348, 353 (Utah 1980: irecognizing
phvsician-patient relationship as source of dutv owed to patient). 4'he phvsician-
patient privilege defined by Rule 506 is expressly conditioned upon this relationship.
Once a patient places his or her condition at issue in litigation, however, the
phvsician-patient privilege ceases to exist with respect to that condition because there-
is as a matter of law no reasonable expectation of confidentiality related to the
medical conditions at issue. 4'his rule is based upon sound public police. A person
seeking to recover damages lor personal injuries allegedly caused bv another should
not be permitted to hide behind the privilege as a wav to prevent inquiry into die
cause' of his or her symptoms.
Additionally, one of the ultimate issues to be resolved in personal injury
litigation is the cause or causes of injury and damage. In order to arrive at the legal
and factual "truth" of the causation issues, medical experts, whether treating
physicians or retained experts, must be allowed to express their opinions within the
bounds of evidentiary rules of foundation. Such causation opinions often differ
bringing them within the province of the fact finder to determine which arc accurate.
44ic introduction by the (;ourt of Appeals' decision of a "fiduciary" duty that
prevents commtinieation about the cause of a patient's ailments that are the subject
ot litigation chills rather than promotes the search tor legal and medical truth.
a he Court of Appeals relied on its analysis in Pchrv v. Ooatcs, as the basis for
its imposition of a duty of confidentiality superseding the physician-patient privilege.
Sorenscn 1i1i 2006 ITT App 14-16. I lowever, neither the facts nor the basis for the
Debry case apply here. In iVbry, the patient did nor place her condition at issue, her
husband did so in the divorce action. 4'he patient did not consent to the release of
the information. 4'he Debry court concluded that ''under thesv cireuni^tajiccs, a
patient must at least be afforded the opportunity for protection." Id. at II 14.
[Emphasis added.) 4'he court continued to quote from 1)cbrv:
Before disclosing confidential patient records or communications
in subsequent litigation, a phvsuian or therapist should notify
the patient, liven if the communications may fall into jthe-1
exception to the privilege, the patient has the right to be notified
of the potential c isclosure of confidential rccorels . . . Such notice-
assures that the patient can pursue the appropriate procedural
safeguards in court to avoid unnecessary disclosure.
Id. at M15 (citing Debry). 4'he Court ofAppeals1 reliance on its Debry ruling m this
mrtter is inapposite. Not only was Nicholas aware that Dr. barbuto had released his
medical records to defense counsel, he expressly consented to that release. In other
words. Dr. barbuto subsequently revealed no confidential information. All the
information that l^>\'. Barbuto reviewed and commented (in was already part of the
discovery record and had been disclosed before Dr. Barbuto's involvement with
cietense counsel.
Ibis brings us to the core of the Court of Appeals' ruling on a physician's
fiduciary dutv of confidentiality. In order for such a duty to exist where the
plwsician patient privilege does not exist and the relevant medical mt'ormation has
au'eadv been released pursuant to patient authorization, the dutv must be totally
independent ol the phvsician-patient privilege, a his concept is not supported bv
cases where courts have addressed that verv issue.
A Louisiana appellate court addressed the issue in Olenn v. Kerlin,
248 So.2d 834 iLa. App. 1971 ;. In CLaim. the patient, who was Imitating a ease
inv< living his physical conditions sued his physician for engaging in a conference
with defense counsel. 4'he court noted that "Idhiring that conference, it is alleged
Dr. kcrhn revealed plaintiffs physical condition and made available plaintiffs
medical records without Anx authorization bv plaintiff and without being so ordered
by this court." Lb >it 854-355 4'he trial court dismissed the claim on the basis of
statutory language similar to § ~8-24-8l4). 4'he appellate court treated the issue
somewhat differently, viewing the claim as An invasion of privacy claim, but affirmed
on similar grounds. 4'he Glenn court noted that a patient mav not continue to claim
a right to privacy governing the physician where he commences litigation which puts
has physical condition at issue. Id. at 856. Based upon the allegations of the
at is important to note that the facts in Glenn were much different from those
here, but the analysis relating to ex parte discussions of supposedly confidential
in:< >rmation applies here.
\l)
complaint, the Glenn court found that the plaintiff tailed to state a cause of action.
Ley
In Moses v. Williams, 549 A.2d 950 (Ta. Super. 1988L a case strikingly
similar to this one, the physician engaged in ex parte pretrial discussions with a
defcaidant's attorney and testified against the patient at trial. 4'he trial court granted
summary judgment, finding no duty. In Moses, the plaintiff claimed that she first
became aware ot the physician's involvement when iier attorney was advised that the
defense intended to call him as An expert witness at trial. Id. at 952. 4'he plaintiff in
Moses made many of the same arguments advanced bv the Sorensens, including
application of AMA ethics gtiidelines And the Hippocratie Oath. She argued that the
physician LLhad a duty to refrain both from taking any actions which would be
adverse'to hexjiiterests in the malpractice litigation and from making any disclosures
to other parties of information gained in the course of his treatment of her, unless
authorized to do so cither by her or by law." El. (emphasis added).
4 he Myyscs court first addressed the breach of confidentiality issue, finding nn
cause of action where the patient had placed her physical condition at issue.
W'e find that within the narrow factual context of this case,
appellant has failed to state a cause of action for beach of
confidentiality. To find otherwise would undermine several well-
established principles of this Commonwealth. We must keep in
mind that when Dr. Krane made his disclosures, appellant had
voluntarily instituted a medical malpractice action against Albert
Einstein and had thereby placed in issue her medical condition.
Given a patient's qualified right to privacy in his or her medical
records and An individual's reduced expectation ofprivacy as a
result ot filing a civil stiit for personal injuries in conjunction
with the policies supporting both the physician/patient privilege
statute and the absolute immunity from civil liability granted to
witnesses in judicial proceedings, we will not recognize the cause
ot action tor breach of confidentiality o.Ljlkd iu_tbis case.
Id. at 955-54 (emphasis in original, footnotes omitted). In its analysis of the
pLintiffs arguments, the Moses court noted that At patient's right to confidentiality
:s less than absolute." Id. at 954. Ac-cord ('ardalk supra. "4'he law is replete wath
statutory justifications Tor disclosure that are deemed to outweigh the patient's right
to confidentiality." Moses, 549 A.2d at 954. 4"he Moses court discussed a
Tennsvivania statute substantivelv- similar to § 78-24-864} and concluded that the
legislation refected a balancing of'the interests in confidentiality against the interests
of justice. LI. at 955.
1he Moses court also rejected a variety of bases for finding a duty which the
physician had breached.
|C|ontniry to appellant's assertions, ethical considerations And
the commonwca th's medical licensing stattites do not provide a
clear-cut source tor recognizing a cause ot action for breach
under the facts as allcgccl in this case. 4'he Hippocratie Oath
does not serve as An absolute bar to disclosures . . . Similarly, the
1980 statement bv the American Medical Association concerning
a doctor's release ot information is broad, provides little
guidance, and does not in any event, prohibit Dr. Kranc's actions
. . . Even the Current Opinions of the Judicial Council of the
AMA do not absolutely par disclosures of confidences. lit fact.
Section 5.07 states that "[a| physician should respect the patient's
expectations ofconfidentiality concerning medical records that
involve the patient's care and treatment." As we have already
noted, an individual's expectations of confidentiality are
diminished when that individual files a civil action for personal
injuries. To allow- recovery at law for conduct such as
1)r. krape's that occurred w itbin the context <if a judicial acti< >n
»'kaixarUy instituted bv appellant would ign<)rc the fact that
appellant's privacy interest was diminisheij bv her
cjinuiiciiCA'ill^^
Id. at 956 (emphasis added').
A patient in Missouri similarly sued his treating physicians for breach of
confidentiality arising from ex parte discussions of his medical conditions vv 4th
defense counsel A\^d testifying at trial against his interests. Brandt v. Medical
Defense Associates, 856 S.W72d 66" oMo, 1995) (en banc)." 4'he Brandt court
hi Brandt, the trial court dismissed the complaint; the court of appeal1
"cverscet: And the Supreme Court ultimately affirmed the dismissal.
struggled with the issue of a fiduciary duty of confidentiality and its relationship to
ethical concerns, concluding that there was such a legal duty but that it was
independent of any ethical duties.
We believe a physician has a fiduciary duty of confidentiality not
to disclose Any medical information received in connection w it la
his treatment of the patient. 1his dutv arises out of'a fiduciary
relationship that exists between the physician and the patient. If
such information is disclosed under circumstances where this
dutv of confidentiality has not been waived, the patient has a
cause ot action for damages in tort against the physician. In
addition to a physician's legal dutv, a physician also has a separate
ethical dutv to maintain the confidentiality of information
received from a patient. W4nle the ethical [Manciples mav
evidence public policy that the courts may consider in framing
the specific limits of the legal duty of confidentiality, this legal
dutv is jo be distinguished from die ethical duty.
LI. at 670-7.1 'emphasis added, citing the I lippocratic oath and the AMA Principles
ot Medical Ethicsj. Elavmg found a dutv, the Brandt court noted that it was not
absolute.
Of course, the physician's testimonial privilege and the fiduciary
duty of confidentiality are not absolute; they must give way if
there is a stronger countervailing societal interest. One such
countervailing societal interest arises when a patient initiates
litigation concerning the patients medical condition. Because
the patient wall of necessity Ise required to waive the medical
privilege in presenting evidence at trial, it is common for courts
to flnctan implied waiver during the discovery stage ofthe
litigation. 4'hc question presented here is whether ex parte
discussions wath the plaintiffs treating physicians are included
within this implied waiver.
Id. at 671. The court concluded that the ex parte discussions fell wathin the waiver.
The fiduciary duty that the physician owes the patient to
maintain in confidence metrical information concerning the
patient's mental or physical condition does nor apply to an ex
parte conference that is within the scope of'the waivers.
Id. at 674.
y>
1he Braudt plaintiff as do the Sorensens, argued that the physician owed a
dutv not to engage in any activ ities adverse to his interests. 44ie TLandt court
rejected that argument.
47ie plaintiffs contention here seems to be bottomed on the
assumption that a treating physician's duty to act vv-ith gi >od faith
requires the physician to give testimony that is favorable and
beneficial to the patient and detrimental to the opponent. Such
an assumption is invalid; a trial is a search for the truth and the
primary obligation that, the treating physician or any other
witness owes in a trial is to tell the truth. If, for instance, a
plwsician has determined that a patient made a full recovery And
this issue is relevant to the litigation, the treating physician mav-.
And in tact should, testify to this fact even though the patient
may be claiming to the contrary.
c_
I he situation is no different where the treating physician is asked
to testify as An expert, dliere is nothing embodied within the
relationship between a treating physician and the patient that
necessarily dictates cither the style or the substance of the
testimony that the treating physician must give at trial, even as
an expert witness. It is not unusual lor a partv to elicit opinions
trom an opponent's expert that support the cross-examiner's side
ot the litigation. 'This is no less, true in the case of the treating
physician than with any other witness.
Id. at 6~5-74 (emphasis added e
Other courts have reached similar results. In Aufrichtig v. Lowell,
609 N7V.S.2d 214 (N.Y. App. 1994i, the court, though critical of the doctor's
actions, found no cause of action in a two-paragraph opinion.
While defendant physician's cavalier attitude in providing
admittedly careless And contradictory testimony, called
"negligent testimony", which he seeks to blame on the
representations allegedly made to him by counsel for both sides,
is hardly commendable, no action lies against him for breach of"
plaintiff patient's confidentiality, plaintiffs having waived
confidentiality bv aftlrmarivclv placing the insured patient's
medical condition in issue m seeking to enjoin the reduction of
insurance benefits.
Id. at 214.
4'he Alabama Supreme Court affirmed, in part, a motion to dismiss a breach
of confidentialiiv claim in Mull v. String., 448 So.2d 952 (Ala. 1984). Recognizing
that there was a cause of action tor 'tin authorized disclosure of information acquircc
during the phvsician-patient" relationship," the court found no cause of action for
breach of confidentiality.
|\V|hen a patient sues a defendant other than his or her
physician, and the information acquired bv the physician as a
result ot the physician-patient relationship would be legally
discoverable pv the defendant in that litigation, then the patient
will be deemed to have waived any right to proceed against the
physician tor the physician's disclosure of this information to that
c'elendant or that defendant's attorney.
Id. at 954.
In Street v. I ledgepady 607 A.2d 1238 (D.C. App. 1992), ihe court affirmed
a directed verdict, holding [\\At ex parte interviews were permissible and that the
el, im of breach of confidentiality was barred bv placing the patient's condition at
issue.
It is significant to note that courts dealing with this physician patient
disclosure issue seem to use the terms "confidentiality," "privacy,"1 and "privilege"
synonymously. Even in eases where courts have discussed the duty of contider.tiality
vvithout using die term "privilege,'1 the same legal constructs are applied. Where
there is no privilege, by virtue of the litigation process, there can be no continued
expectation ot confidentiality or privacy. In other words, the dutv of confidentiality
and the phvsician-patient privilege are coextensive and cannot be judicially separated
without creating a conflict in their independent application. Here the Court of
Appeals has created aduty ofconfidentiality clearly independent from the physician-
patient privilege. This common law dutv is inconsistent not only with Utah statute
And Utah Rules ofEvidence, but is also with the hulk ofthe case law on point.
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IV. PUBLIC; POLICY IS NOT WELL-SERVED BY HAVING A DUTY
OE CONT IDEN 1TALI TY WHICH EXCEEDS THE SCOPE OE THE
PHYSICIAN-PATIENT PRIVILEGE.
As discussed above, the duties running from a physician to a patient arise
solely from the phvsician-paricnt relationship. Absent that formal relationship, there
is no dutv. 4"hc same is true with the phvsician-patient privilege. 44ie privilege
cxpts onlv because confidential information is exchanged dtiring the existence of the
relationship. 4"he analytical problem present here is that both the dutv of
confidentiality And the privilege are based upon the need to preserve a patient's
reasonable expectation of' priv acv with respect to c< mtldential intormation. If Ave
permit a patient to place his or her condition at issue in litigation, thereby losing the
privilege, hut superimpose An ongoing dutv of confidentiality on the part of the
physician, we create An unworkable dichotomy. We make1 it virtually impossible for
a physician to determine when it is appropriate for him to discuss the patient's
condition ^]^d when it isn't. 4'he simple solution for the physician is to refuse to
discuss patient condition with anybody. Tins presents an unnecessary impediment to
truth seeking in the litigation process.
d'he quest lor truth is similarly impeded where rules or duties require that a
physician only provide support tor the patient's claims, regardless of whether ihere is
medical evidence tor those claims. 4'ruth requires that a physician testify as to his
honest conclusions based upon examination And treatment, regardless of whether
those opinions acv ultimately accurate.
I he av ow ed ptirpi ise oi the Rules pr< lclaimed bv this Court, as well as the
frequently pronounced desire to produce judicial economy, is to penu.it efficient
resolution of litigation at the lowest reasonable cost. Informal discussion between
counsel And a treating physician to determine whether it is worth the time And
expense to depose the physician or call him/her as a witness at trial is An efficient
method of tact finding that costs substantially less than deposing every treating
physician. Under the duty created bv the Court of Appeals, however, engaging in
that phone call, regardless of what transpired, would be An actionable breach of the
duty of confidentiality tor which the lawyer is immune from liability but the
physician is not. 4'his is true even though the patient's records had already been
produced in the litigation. As a result, the only way for defense counsel to make the
initial evaluation of whether a physician's testimony is necessary ax trial would be to
go to the expense of conducting a formal deposition of the physician and even then,
according to the Court ofAppeals, the physician would be precluded iiom testifying.
Public policy supports rules of law which are constant, predictable and
universally applicable. 4'he ( ourt of Appeals" decision undermines such a policy.
Before this matter, Dr. Barbuto could not have reasonably anticipated that his
participation with defense counsel would give rise to tort litigation. Even after the
decision by the Court of Appeals, there is no resolution of the inconsistencies
between the rules of privilege, the applicable statute, and the common law fiduciary
dutv ofconfidentiality. Added to this mix is the Court ofAppeals1 conclusion that
attorneys are legally permitted to engage in ex parte communications wth physicians,
but a physician who engages in ex parte communications with An attorney may be
civilly liable for that same act. The Court of Appeals' decision creates a new ore of
law which is neither predictable nor universally applicable. Public policy concerns
weigh in favor of reversing that decision.
CXlNOAJ_ST()N
The Court of Appeals' decision establishes apnvsician duty of confidentiality
which is not subject to waiver when the patient places his condition at issue in
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hligation. Based upon that dutv, the ruling prohibits exparte com. muni canons bv a
physician, despite statutory authorization to engage in them and absent anv
provision in this ( ourfs rules which \\ ould support that result. 'This new common
law dutv cannot coexist wath the applicable rule's of privilege And the legislative
authority for physician conduct. Public policy weighs against the creation of a duty
of this tvpe. Dr. Barbuto therefore respeetftilK- requests that this Court reverse the
Court ot'Appeals ruling on the dutv issue and affirm the trial court's dismissal of the
Sorensens" Complaint.
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Court ol Appeals of l'tah.
Nicholas SORENSKN. Kevin Sorensen. and
Pamela Sorenscn. limited guardians and
conservators of Nicholas Sorenscn. Plaint His and
Appellants.
v.
John P. BARBUTO. individually: and John P.
Barbuto. M.P.. P.C dha Neurotog\
In Focus. Defendants and Appellees.
No. 2005050I-CA.
•\uii. in. 2(]i!f-,.
Background: Patient, who was injured as result ol
be;:1.2 passenger in single-automobile accident,
bronchi action for breach ot contract, and various
tort claims, against former Healing physician after
physician encaged m e\ parte communications with
dcfer.se counsel ;:i patient's underlying personal
miurv action again1-! alleged tortfeasor. The Third
District Court. Salt Lake Department. Tvrone
Medlcv. J., granted physician's motion to dismiss
Patient appealed.
Holdings: The Couit of Appeals. Bench. J., held
' 1 i ?h\sici;.:i's ^oiiduct would not support claim lor
breach o; implied connact;
CJP> physician's e.\ part communications constituted
breach oi ph\ sician's fiduciary duty ol
eonfidemiality:
(3i pinsieian could be liable lor negligent breach ot
fidticiarv duty of confidentiality:
:-i ph\si<.;ar,'s e\ pane conimunicat:on was no;
public disclosure required to maintain chum lor
invasion oi pnvacv:
Oi doctor's statements in deposition were piotected
bv "jovial p:oceed:ug privilege;
iCi i pm--icum's conduct met ihicshnld n.eecs'-aiy to
maintain action :or
intentional infliction of emotional distress: and
ib uidiual proceeding privilege did nol apply to
piotea phvsiciar, irom patient's ehum tor iiucntior.ai
uiiliciion of emotional distress.
A!f:rmed m pan and reversed 1:1 part.
1] Appeal and Emir <°='X42(1}
c. 200b Thomson West. No Chum to Oris:. U.S. Govi. Works.
3(TS42(1)
Propriety of trial court's decision to giant or deny
motion to dismiss for failure to state claim on which
relief can be granted is question of law that Court of
Appeals reviews lor correctness. Rules Civ.Proc,
Rule 12(b)(6).
[21 Appeal and Krror <^=l)V)
30k9l9
In reviewing trial court order granting motion to
dismiss for failure to state chum on which relief can
he granted, appellate court must accept material
allegations ot complaint as :rue. and appellate court
will affirm trial court's inling only it it clearly
appears complainant can prove no set ot (acts in
support of his or he: Claims. Rules Civ.Prnc. Rule
12ibnnl.
[3] Health *S=642
19SHk642
Conduct ot patient's tormcr treating physician m
entailing in e.\ parte communications with detente
anomev in patient's underlying personal injury
aciion against alleged toriicasor would not support
claim tor breach oi implied contract: breach oi dutv
oi confidentiality could not be pursued as breach of
implied contract
[4] Health ^=625
19SHk625
Statute on liability of health care provider to patient
for bleach of contract does :-,(1t preclude all contract
claims aeainst physician absent written contract
signed bv physician or Ins designated agent, as
statute specifically pio\ ides that claim against
pinsieian must be in wntmg it it is based on
"guarantee, warranty, contract or assurance ot
result." West's U.C.A. i> 78-14-6.
[5] Health <®=^642
;9SIIkM2
Statute on liability of health care provider to patient
for breach ol contract did not apply to patient's
Cairn against former Healing phvsiuan tor alleged
breach of implied contract by communicating ex
parte with defense counsel in patient's underlying
tort action aeamst alleged '.ortteasor: patient did not
contend that physician bad promised particular result
with his treatment. West's U.C.A. $ 78-14-6.
[(.I Torts <S^350
379k350
2006 WI.. 2291182
(Cte as: 2006 \VU 2291182 (Utah App.))
Courts have immediately recognized legally
compensable injury m wrongful disclosure ot
confidential information based on variety ol grounds
:oi reancrv: public policv; right to privacy; breach
nf contract: and bleach of fiduciary duty.
]7] Health <@=579
b^Hkcb
171 Health <&=>MZ
l'CHk642
Doctor and patient enter into simple contract, with
pauent hoping thai he will be cuied. and doctor
op nnhiicailv assuming that he will be compensated
,;;id, as implied condiiion of that contracl. doctor
warrants that am confidential information gained
thiough relationship will not be released without
pauent's peimission
[SJ Health <S^57S
PHHk578
[S] Health <S=?642
19SHkb42
Eovm contractual iclationship between patient and
physician ai lses fiducia.rv obligation that confidences
i o rinmuicated bv patient should be held a.s trust,
which sjives use io implied covenant which, when
bleached, is acbonable. hut physician-patient
ielaliouslnp contemplates additional duty ol
Loifxlennaliiv. springing from, but exlraneous to.
untract and breach ol such duly is actionable as tori
lathei than as breach ol contracl.
[9] Health <®^642
l9XHk642
Although physician-patient relationship had
teimmaied before plivsiciari engaged m ex part
lo nmunicaiions with defense counsel in patient's
underlying persoi al injury action against alleged
lorifeasoi. tort-based duty of confidentiality
lo itiuued alter tei mination oi physician-patient
relationship, and thus physician's ex pan
communications constituted hi each of physician's
fiduciary duty of confidentiality.
110] Witnesses <§^219(4.1)
•110k219(4.l)
h\ieption to phvsician-paticni privilege applicable
when palieiit's condition is element ot claim or
defense is not without limits. Rules ot E.vid., Rule
M>b(I>XD
|ll] Witnesses c^20S(I)
Page 2
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[11] Witnesses <@^>214.5
410k214.5
As part of therapeutic iclationship, doctor or
iheiapist has obligation to protect confidentiality of
his patients that transcends any duty he has as citizen
to voluntarily piovide mfoimalion that might be
relevani in pending litigation. Rules of Evid., Rule
Mib(D)(l).
112] Health <®=?(>42
19SlIkb42
Physician could lie liable for negligent breach of
fiduciary dutv oi confidentiality by engaging in ex
parte communications with defense counsel in
Homier patient's underlying personal injury action
against alleged tortfeasor.
[13] Torts <S=351
379k?.SI
Physician's ex parte communication with counsel lor
defense in burner patient's underlying personal
miiiiv action against alleged tortfeasor, and several
of defense counsel's associates, was disclosure to
small croup ol persons, and was not public
disclosure requned to maintain claim for invasion of
privacy.
[14] Torts-©^350
37'>k3o0
Size of audience that icceives communication,
though important consideration, is not dispositive ot
issues m invasion of privacy case; lather lads and
ciicumstances ol paiticular case must be taken into
cnnsidciation m determining whether disclosure was
sufficiently public so as to support claim for invasion
oi p] ivacy.
[15] 'Ports <@^359
379U3S9
Although physician's alleged ex parte disclosure of
foimei patient's confidential information to defense
counsel in patient's underlying personal injury action
against alleged tortfeasor was made matter ol public
iccoid thiough deposition of physician taken in
patient's action against physician lor invasion oi
privacy, doctor's statements were proiected by
judicial proceeding privilege; physician's statements
in deposition were part of judicial proceeding,
physician's description of his communications with
defense counsel was diiectly related to purpose of
di position, and physician testified as witness in
deposition.
<.;• 200b Thomson/West. No Claim to Oiig. U.S. Govt. Wotks.
2"'"» WL 229! ;S2
(Cite us; 200b \VU 22911S2 (Utah App.))
[lb] Torts <§^359
379k359
To establish judicial proceeding privilege to claim of
invasion ot privacy action, statements must he: u>
ma.de burinc. or :n course of, uidicial proceeding:
(2) have some reference to subject mallei ot
TocLcdim:. and i?i be made !w someone acting in
oapaL uv ot iiidgc. juror, witness, litigant, or
counsel,
[17] Damages <©=:57.25<4)
ll?ko37.25(4)
Phvs.cians coiiiiuct in engaging in e\ parte
commuiueations with defense counsel in tonner
patieni's underlying tort action against alleged
tortfeasor, and in agieeing to act as paid advocate
for tonner patient's adversary, met threshold
neccssarv to maintain action for intentional infliction
ot emotional distress.
[IS] Damages <&=>20X<6)
113k2f'S'6i
It is ;o: coiiit to determine, in lust instance, whether
deieiidant's conduct may reasonably be regarded as
so extreme and outrageous as to permit recovery lor
intentional inf.iction of emotional distress.
[19] Damages <®^57.49
!15k".4Q
Because physician's acts of communicating ex pane
with defense counsel in former patient's personal
inu;rv action acainst alleged tortfeasor, and agreeing
to be expert witness for defense, were not legally
msp.p.ed. 'tuhcial proceeding privilege did not apply
to pioteci ph\s;cian from former patient's claim tor
iniciihonal infliction ot emotion;:! distress.
West Codenoles
Yahduv Called into Doubt
West's U.C.A. i 78-24-8(4)
L. Rich tinmpherys and Karra J. Porter.
Chns'.enscn <\: Jensen. PC, Salt Pake City, for
Appellants.
Dennis C. Ecrguson, Williams & Hunt, Salt Lake
CAw to: Appellees.
Behue BENCH. P.J.. BILLINGS, and OR.VIE, JJ.
OPINION
BENCH. Ihe-idinc Judge:
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"1 • 1 Nicholas Seiensen (Sotenseni and lus limited
guardians, Kevin and Pamela Sorenscn. appeal the
trial court's order granting Dr. John P, Barbuto's
iBarbuto"') motion to dismiss. We affirm in part and
reverse in part.
BACKGROUND [EN1]
'" 2 In 1999. Sorenscn sustained serious back and
head injuries as a passenger in a single-automobile
accident. Over the next vcar and a half. Barbuto
treated Sorenscn for head iniuries and sei/ures. 1 lie
treatment included diagnostic examinations,
prescriptions lor medicine, and cognitive therapy.
When Sorensen's medical in.suier removed Barbuto
from its approved providers list. Sorenscn
terminated his phv sieian-paiient relationship with
Barbuto and continued his treatment wuh another
physician.
*' 3 Sorenscn then filed a pcisnnal iniury action
against the driver's liability insurer (the personal
injury action). In that action. Barbuto produced
Sorensen's medical :i\orcs. and the trial court
admitted the records as stipulated evidence. Defense
counsel subpoenaed Barbuto for trial, which was
initially scheduled to: May 2<n3. The court latci
postponed the trial until October. Between May and
October, Barbuto engaged in ex parte
communications with dctense counsel, prepared a
ten-page report for defense numsel's use, and
agreed to testily as an expert witness for the defense.
Contrary to lus earlier diagnosis. Barhuio asserted
that psychological and social tactors contributed to
Sorensen's medical iniuries.
* 4 Soienseu first learned about Barbuto's ex parte
communications with defense counsel during a
deposition oA another witness. Consequently,
Sorensen's counsel deposed Barbuto and tiled an
emergency motion in limine. The irial court
excluded Barbuio's testimony. and Sorenscn
prevailed in the personal injurv action.
* 5 Subsequently. Smeuscri filed this action against
Bfuhuio. In this complain!. Sorenscn asserts breach
of contract and various tort causes of action based on
Barbuio's ex parte communicjiions with defense
counsel. Barbuto tiled a rule i2<bi:bi motion to
dismiss. See Utah R. Civ. P. I2(b)ibi. The trial
court granted ihe motion to dismiss, and Sorenscn
now appeals.
ISSUE AND STANDARD OE REVIEW
111[2] *i 6 Soreiisen asserts thai the trial court erred
100b Thomson West. No Chum to Orip. U.S. Govt. Woiks.
20(ib WE 2291 182.
(Cite as: 200b WL 22911S2. M (Utah App.))
in ei amine. Baibuto's motion lo dismiss. "The
pi ipriciv tit a trial couit's decision to giant or deny
a moiion lo dismiss under rule 12vb)(6) is a question
ot law that we review for eonectness." Marker v.
Cannon. 2000 UT App 36.' 9. 99b P.2d JOSl
(cjioianons and citation omitted); see also Utah R.
Civ. P 1200(0i. 'IA|n appellate court must accept
the material allegations of the complaint as true" and
will affirm the trial court's ruling only "if it clearly
appeals the complainant can prove no set of facts in
su ipoii of his oi her claims." Mm key. 2000 UT App
36 at • 9. 99b P.2d 1081 (quotations and citation
onulled i.
ANALYSIS
I. Contract Claim
[;I1'EI1-C1 * ~i Soiens-en asseits that the trial court
cried in dismissmc his claim that Barbuto bleached
his eoniractual duties. Barbuto aigues. and the trial
co.irt agreed, that Sorensen's contracl claim fails
because the parties did not enter into a written
as: cement. Barbuto relies on Utah Code section
7S 14-6. which prov ides.
:'2 No babditv shall be imposed upon any health
caie provider on the basis of an alleged breach of
I'uarantee, warranty, conn act or assurance ot
ics.ih lo be obtained from anv health care rendeied
unless the guarantee, wan anty, contract or
assuiance is set foith in writing and signed by the
health caie provide! oi an authorized agent of the
ptovider.
Utah Code Ann. v- "8 14-b (2002). Baibuto
contends thai, under this section. "Utah law
piecludes |all| contracl claims against a physician
absent a wi ilten conn act signed by ihe physician or
his designated agent." We disagree. '1 he statute is
noi as broad as Baibuto asserts. It specifically
provides dial a claim against a physician must be in
vvniiiiij if it is based on a "guarantee, wairanty,
conn act or assurance of icsult." Id. (emphasis
added i. Soiensen does not contend that Barbuto
promised a particular result with his treatment.
Raihei, he chums thai Barbuto bleached an implied
coutiact bv communicating ex parte with defense
counsel m the personal injur \ action. '1 here!ore.
section 78-14-6 is not applicable.
• S Soiensen's implied conliact claim tads.
however, on oilier giounds. Sorenscn terminated the
plmsHian-pancnt relationship prior lo Barbuto's ex
parte commuillations with defense counsel. Sec
Xnks i, liudye. 91 Utah 307. 64 P.2d 208. 211
<11.37) (staling thai the physician-patient relationship
tan be terminated ' bv ihe dischaige oi the physician
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by the patient"). Although Barbuto concedes that
"the dulv of confidentiality extends beyond the
termination of the physician-patient relationship," a
breach of this duty cannot be pursued as a breach of
an implied contract.
|6J|7] ",1 9 "Courts have immediately recognized a
lecallv compensable injury in ... wrongful disclosure
based on a variety of grounds for recovery: public
policy; right to privacy: breach of contract; [and]
breach of fiduciary dutv." MacDnnald v. dinger, 84
ATU2c 4S2, " 446 N.Y.S.2d 801, 802
(N.Y.App.Div.1982) (citing 61 Am.Jur.2d
Pii\su lans. Surgeons and Oilier Healers £ 169)
(other citation omitted). In MacDonald, the court
discussed whether a party can allege a breach of
implied contract based solely upon a doctor's bleach
of the duty ot confidentiality to a former patient. See
id. at 802-03. A " '|d]octor and patient enter into a
simple contracl. the patient hoping that he will be
cured and the doctor optimistically assuming thai he
will be compensated.' " Id. at 803 (quoting
Hammonds v. Aetna Cms. & Sut. Co., 243 E.Supp.
793. 80] (D.Ohio 1965)). In addressing the natuie
of this contractual relationship, the court slated that
" ']ajs an implied condition of that contract ... the
doctoi warrants that any confidential information
gamed through the relationship will not be released
without the patient's permission.' " Id. (quoting
Hammonds, 243 E.Supp. at 801).
[8] * 10 "[E]iom the contractual relationship arose a
fiduciary obligation that confidences communicated
bv a patient should be held as a trust." id. (citing
Hammonds, 243 E.Supp. at 803). "It is obvious then
thai this lelationship gives rise to an implied
covenant which, when breached, is actionable." Id.
at 804. The MacDonald court concluded, however.
thai "ihe relationship contemplates an additional duty
[of confidentiality] springing from but extraneous to
the contract and that the breach of such duly is
actionable as a tort." Id. The court there! ore
"dismissed the cause oi action for breach oi
contract." Id. at 805; see also Doe v. Community
Health Plan-Kaiser Corp., 268 A.D.2d 183, 709
N.Y.S.2d 215. 217 (N.Y.App. Div.21)00.) ("ITJhe
duty not to disclose confidential personal information
springs from die implied covenant oi trust and
confidence that is inheient in the physician-patient
relationship, the breach of which is actionable as a
tort."). We similarly conclude that Sorenscn can
puisne his bicaeh of confidentiality claim under tort
thcoiY, but not under contract theory.
o 2006 Thomson/West. No Chum to Oris.'. U.S. Govt. Works.
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II. Tort Chums
A, Breach ol Professional Duty
*3 * 11 Soiensen asserts that Barbuto breached
vanous duties, including fiduciary duties o:
confidential] iv and loyalty, and violated several
professional standards. [FN2J Barbuto contends that
he did not hieaJi a dutv of caie because his actior.s
were protected under Utah Code section 78-24- Si4i
rind rule 506idnl) oi the Utah Rules oi Evidence.
Set Utah Code Ann. >• 78-24-8(4 i <I992u Utah R.
Ex ill. 506idn 1 i.
*" 12 Tins court expressly held in Dthn \. Goato,
20n" UT App 58. 999 P.2d 582. that rule 50b has
superseded section 78-24-8(4). See id. ai r 24 :i. 2
(' [T]he statutory privilege has no lurther ellea.
PiivsiLia.n-patient and therapist-patier,! privileges are
now exclusively controlled by [rjule 50b."): see also
»>..-.-< - «,>!,/,» "Viiib UT 14 *' '.? 1^ P.3d 370M( f/i. 200 . 12, 3?
iconfirming that rule 506 superseded the statutory
privilege in .section 78-24-8(40. Thereto
address the issue onlv under rule 5^6.
re. we wil
[911 in] «,' 13 Rule 506 defines phvsician-patient
privileges and delineates exceptions:
No privilege exists under this rule:
As io a communication relevant to an issue ot ihe
phvsi^al. mental, or emotional condition ol the
-alien: in anv proceeding in which that condition is
an element ot any claim or defense, or, alter the
patient's death, in anv proceedings in which any
partv relies upon the condition as an element ot the
chum or deieuse[.]
I tab R, Evuh 506(d)(1). Barbuto argues that
because Sorenscn placed bis condition at issue in the
peisonal miurv actum, Soiensen waived the
phv siLiar.-patieiit privilege. This exception to the
phvsx-.an-palient privilege, however, is not without
iiniits. See Dchn-, 2000 UT App 58 at \ 26. 999
P.2d 5S2.
[il| * M In l)fhn\ this conn held that because ihe
husband had the right to put at issue his wife's
mental s;a:e as a defense in a divorce proceeding,
the exception ot rule 500(d)(1) applied. See id. ai *
25. Based cm that exception, the husband solicited an
at Pel;.'. ;t Horn the w lie's therapist : eg arcmg me
wile's mental condition. See id. at r 5, The therapist
submitted bus affidavit "without consulting [with ihe
witc' it obiaiuiuc her consent." Id. ' Eiom an that
appears, [ihe therapist! voluntarily furnished am
at'idavit about his patient's mental condition to her
ad-eisarv m invoice litigation." Id. at *' 2 . llm
couit held dial 'tinder these eiicumstanccs. ?. patient
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must at least be a* forded the opport unity foi
protection." Id. at •' 28. "As part oi a therapeutic
relationship, a doctor or therapist has an obligation
to protect the confidentiality oi his patients that
transcends any duty he has as a ciii/en to voluntarily
provide information that might be relevant in
pending litigation." Id.
r 15 Sorenscn and Barbuto both discuss ai length
whether ex parte communication between a parly's
physician and the opposing side in pending litigation
is a breach ol the physician's fiduciary duty of
confidentiality. Although Dti-n did not explicitly
state that a physician's ex parte communication with
the opposing side constitutes a hieach ol
confidentiality, its reasoning readily leads m such a
conclusion. The court stated that "[hjefore disclosing
confidential palieni records or communications in
subsequent litigation, a physician or therapist should
notify the patient. Even if the communications may
fall into [the] exception to the privilege, the patient
has the ncht to be notified of die potential disclosure
oi confidential records.' Id. "Such notice assuies
that the patient can puisne the appropriate proceduial
safeguards in court to avoid unnecessary disclosure."
Id.
*4 * 16 Consistent with the reasoning ol Dchiy. we
hold that ex parte eommuiucaticn between a
physician and opposing counsel constitutes a breach
of the physician's fiduciary dutv of confidentiality.
[EN3] See id. at"'" 24-29. This holding is consistent
with the approach of other courts. See, c t?., Mamon
\. X.r.W. Med. Ctr. of S.E. Pa.. Inc.. 676 F.Supp.
5S5. 593 (D.Pa.l98~i 0'[T]he prohibition against
unauthorized ex pane contacts regulates only how
defense counsel may obtain information from a
plaintiff's treating physician, i.e.. it attects detense
counsel's methods, not the substance oi what is
discoverable.... In addition, the prohibition extends
bevond the termination oi medical tieaiment and
applies with equal foice to a plaintiff's current and
former treaiine doctors."h Peinllo v. Sxnicx Labs.,
Inc., 148 lll.App.3d 5S1. EC 111.Dec. U2. 499
N.E.2ci 952, 957 \19S6i t "We believe .. that ex
pane conferences between defense counsel and a
plaintiffs treating phvs'.cian /copardi/e the sanctity
o\ the physician-patient relationship, and. therefore,
are prohibited as against public policy.'0: Morns v.
Consolidation Coat Co., 191 W.Va. 426. 446
S.E.2d 648, 051 (1994) ("The patient's implicit
consent ... is obviously and necessarily limited; he
does not consent, simply by filing '•uif, to his
physician's diseussiiiLt his medical confidences with
c 2<i06 Thomson Woi. No Chum to Oug. U.S. Covt, Works.
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thud parties outside court- authorized discovery
methods, nor does he consent to bus physician
discussing the patient's confidences in an ex parte
conference with the patient's adversary." (quotations
and citation omittedn; Philip IE Corboy. Ex Parte
Coniacis Between Plaintiff's Physician and Defense
Attorneys: P/oicdiin; the Paiiint Litigant's Right to
a Pair Trial. 21 Lew. U. Chi. ET. 1001, 1002
(1990) ( "Recent slate court decisions, including
seven:! overruling prior precedent, now reflect a
sti on<' majoi iiv view that condemns. r\ paiie
coherences."). Tlicrcloicu the uial court erred in
dismissing Soiensen's claim for hi each ol
co Uidentiahty.
[I2[ " 17 Soiensen additionally argues that the trial
conn erred m dismissing his negligence chum.
Baibuto contends that Sorensen's negligence claim
fails as a mailer of law because no duty existed.
Because we have determined that a duty exists, the
tinil court cried in dismissing Sorensen's claim for
negligence.
B, Invasion ol Pnv acy
[13| • 18 Soiensen contends that ihe trial court
cried in dismissing his invasion of privacy claim.
Baibuio asseris that Sorensen's claim fails as a
mallei ol law because "theie was. no public
d:sCo-aie oj private information by Di. Barbuto."
In Shauuck-Owcn v Snowlnid Corp., 2000 UT 94,
16 P.3d 555. the Utah Supreme Court ruled that
"Lommnnjcatmg a private fact to a small group of
peisons ... does not constitute public disclosure." Id.
at ' 12 (quotations and citation omitted). The
supi cine court concluded that the defendant's
disclosure to approximately twelve to thiiteen people
did not constitute a public disclosure. See id. at II 13.
Ac.lnding i(i die complaint in our case, Barbuto
disclosed pnv ale inhumation to defense counsel and
a few of his associates. Thus, Barbuto disclosed the
inloinialion to "a small group ot poisons." Id. at ^
*5 114] *' 10 Soiensen contends that ihere is no
specific "body count" requited to constitute an
invasion ol privacy. The Shottuck-Owen court
specified that "the sj/e oi the audience that receives
the communication. though an important
consideration, is not dispositive of the issues." Id.
'Rather, the facts and circumstances of a particular
case must be taken into consideration in determining
wluiher ihe disclostiie was sufficiently public so as
to s'lopoit ,1 claim foi invasion ot privacy." Id.
WI en consuleimc all the circumstances in this case.
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we aie not pcisuaded that the disclosure to defense
counsel and a lew incidental people constitutes a
public disclosure.
[15]|lh] *" 20 Sorenscn also contends that because
he had to depose Barbuto to find out the extent ot his
inappropriate actions, Barbuio's disclosures became
a matter of public record. Barbuto argues in his brief
that ih s cannot constitute an invasion of privacy
because of the judicial proceeding privilege. We
agree, "To establish the judicial proceeding
Iinvilege, the statements must be (1) made during or
in the course of a judicial proceeding; (2) have some
iefeience lo the subject matter of the proceeding:
and (3) be made by someone acti/ig in the capacity of
judge, juror, witness, litigant, or counsel." Debry v.
Godhi. 1999 UT 11J." 11. 992 P.2d 979 (quotations
and citation omitted). Under the first prong,
Barbuto's statements in the deposition were clearly
part ot a judicial proceeding. Sec id, at *1 14. ("The
privilege applies to every step in the proceeding until
final disposition." (quotations and citation omitted)).
Second. Barbuio's description of his communications
with defense counsel was directly related to the
purpose of the deposition. And third, Barbuto
testified as a witness in the deposition. Because the
judicial proceeding privilege applies to the
deposition. Sorensen's invasion of privacy claim
fails as a mailer oi law.
C. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress
[17JJ18] • 21 Sorenscn next contends that the trial
court cured in dismissing his claim of intentional
infliction of emotional distress.
|A|n action lor severe emotional distress, though
noi accompanied by bodily impact or phvsical
injur v. [mav lie] where the defendant intentionally
engaged in some conduct toward die phuntilt. (a)
wnh die purpose oi inflicting emotional distress,
oi, (b) wheie any reasonable person would have
known thai such would result; and his actions are
ol such a nature a.s to be considered outrageous
and intolerable in that they offend against the
gene: ailv accepted standards of decency and
moialitv.
Id. at *t\ 25 (alterations in original) (quotations and
citation omittedh "(l]l is for the court to determine,
in the iiisi instance, whether the defendant's conduct
may reasonaiily be regarded as so extreme and
outrageous as to permit recovery." Schuunnan v.
Shinylcton, 2001 UT 52.<| 23, 26 P.3d 227
(quotations and citation omitted) The trial court in
this ease found that Barbuto's: actions, as a mailer of
law, were not "extreme and outrageous," We
C 200b Thomson/West. No Claim to One. U.S. Covt. Works.
2006 WL 2291182
(Cite as: 2006 WL 2291182. '5 (Utah App.
ihsaciec. Barbuto not only communicated c\ parte
w uh deler.se counsel--Barbuto actually became a
paid adv OLate tor Sorensen's adversary. "We
conclude thai the conduct alleged here .. meets :hc
threshold necessary to maintain an action lor
intentional infliction of emotional distress." Walter
i. Stcv.an. 2"03 Ui App 86/ 2S 67 P.3d 1"42.
•(} [19| * 22 Barbuto also argues thai even if his
conduct satisfied ihe extreme and outrageous
rccuiiemeiit. the i_laim is barred by ihe 'udicia,!
proceeding privilege. See Dehr\. 1999 UT HI at «
25. 992 P.2d 979 (applying the judicial proceeding
pnvjlecc to an intentional infliction of emotional
distress vh.imi. Because Barbuto's ai_;s ei
communicating ex parte with defense counsel and
acueeiuc lo fie an expert witness for the defense
weie not lecallv iusiitied, the judicial pro*.ceding
pi :v ilege does not apph . See id. at * 21; Pu hany \.
Sordstnm:, Inc.. 812 P.2d 49, 58 (Utah 1991 i
(conchidmc: that the "plaintiff can show abuse ot [a]
p::vi!c.v by piovme liiat the detendaut ailed w;;ir
malice ot ::.at die publication ot the ciciaiuaioiv
materia! extended bevond those who had a legally
ui'tificd reason tor receiving U"d
CONCLUSION
* 23 Baibulo and Soiensen's relationship ended
before Baibuto communicated ex parte with defense
counsel. However, Barbuto's tort-based duty of
l onftdcuilndiiv continued. Funher, because a dutv
existed, tiie tiial court erred in dismissing Sorensen's
claim for negligence,
* 24 Soicuseii''- invasion ot privacy chum tails
!iecau>e Barbuto's disclosure lo defense counsel did
noi conMiiuie a public disclosure, and his statements
:u 'die L'leposiiion tall under the judicial proceeding
pnv ilece. We conclude, however. thlU Baibulo's
actions meei the threshold to maintain a claim lor
Vuiiv 7
intentional infliciion of emoiional distress.
'" 25 Accordingly, we reverse in part the older
granting Barbuto's motion to dismiss, and remand
for further proceedings.
' 26 WE CONCUR: JUDITH M. BILLINGS and
GREGORY K, ORME. Judges.
EM. 'becai>c ihi•- is an appeal trom a motion to
dismiss Or ladaic lo si^te a claim, we accept the
tactual allegations in Uie complaint as true and
draw all leasnnahli- inferences fmm [hose lacts in
ilie Iis." Jit most hoerahlc to [Soiensen|." Mai key v
Cannon. 2m'i"i Of App 36.r 2. "'^ P 2d ]f)?l
iquotauons ,md uiaiinn nmined >.
EN2. baibuio l •oUoiilN dial Soiensen is not
entitled ai a rrn..'.ie nghi ci amnn tor breach nf
professional -landarcb. Sorenscn does n;'l contenc!
in his bind, however, dial a pro.iie right of action
exists Kaihci. he as sens th;ii ihe prutcssional
aamljids i. . :nr0••:i[c- m die ; i"p; i •land.;id ni
caie, siinie ibe Healih Insula::.c IVna: slip, ami
Accinintahilitv Aci OliPAAu tiro American
Medical Asocial inn's Prim ipies nt Medical
I thics. and l!;e lbpp >.:.m. U:i!i
EN3. Haihulo aigues thai ex ;i;uie Lommutiicaiions
are allowed pui.-aani to tire Liah Sane Bar I lilies
Advisui\ Opinion N'n lC'-o*. However, die Olah
State Bin Ethics Advisor. Op:m 'ii Committee
addresses llie lesporisihiiilics ot attorneys, not
plivsieians. HecauH' die is-ue m this ea.se concerns
a ptivsr :aii's j'L;i\ . i!:e ethics : mni'm does not
app!>.
--- E.od ----. :n()n WL 2291 182 (Utah App,). 20(16
UT App ?40
END OF DOCUMENT
•c. 2006 Thomson West. No Claim to One U.S. Govt. Works.
Addendum B
'SB HAOC ('pmioii l"'tJ-6?
h£dc bar
Kind a Law, or
Em Directones
~,;i. c Seror.es
'dorrb6f Scoops
Ad missions
0" E
Kl..cs_&_C. pi/iic ns
C.PC
La.v & ^stice Center
Utah Bar Journal
Match ALL words
Search |
hup: www utalibar.org rules ops po!s ethics opinions op 99 b? html
UTAH STATE BAR
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Opinion No. 99-03
(Approved May 28, 1999)
Issue: r/iav a cefo-
physician?
e c> c-nrtc contact voth riairUrf s ;rean
Opinion: be etn.cal c !e nrcCoits c-x parte ccntact with pis rn~ s treat rg
physician when pla rinTs physical condition is at issue
Analysis: Uis 'leCcr ji-cc-m;o rcr im.p'oper. under the _:ao Euies of
Professional CcncL.rt. T,r an attorney 1c make ex pcalc contacts with witnesses
involved in a controversy, inducing witnesses for the adversary When that
witness 'S a rrecicai ccocr escocai'y c~e who has treated toe ::laoiC-f m a
iligation, concerns may be raised aoout the physician s and ooth iawyers
ethical responsibilities to maintain confidences and to obine by other
professional rescens bilit es
in cases where the wifness-phys'cian is not separately represented by another
iavwer in the matter de-re 's no ;:rov:sicn of the Rules of Precessions Core net
mat probibits a cehr^e attorney 'mm m.aking an ex Oode co-tart win the
plaintiffs treating p-iysician
Although tbere may be a pctc nal fcr ethical misconduct aos -g cut C sjch a
contact, such misconduct can be separately addressed and remecaec in
accordance wdh the apprcpna'o roles In an opinion iej-uc-c .r M'92 the
American Ear Assouiat.cn • eic that no provision of the blcce1 f-m'ss cf
Professional Conduct directly prohibits ex parte contacts with the other side s
witnesses in civil natters The AEA epimon discusses the eth'oal rules in light
of expeb witnesses as well as 'act witnesses
Thicre aie nonetheless some ethical limitations that apply to
contacts win any wtress and some addition?:! 'imitations mat
may nave eahVert appixat.on to expert witnesses. Amcng toe
former, the prncp&l imitations are the obligations ot carder
impcsec Cy Rude -_3 en ceaimg with umopiesentec persons,
'.'•.'hen a lawyer car-ants any witness, lay or oxpe-l. actual cr
potential, a lawyer must not knowingly leave the witness in
•anorarce m toe '?w.\ei s 'elafionship to the case 'hat g'ves
oocaS'OC to 'me ccntact F-artoeo tbe lawyer mav not. ccosister.t
with Rule 4 tia) . convey the message, directly cr indirectly, ihst
Rule Cited:
4,3
M C2006 Kbil? AM
:Sb EACC Opinion lW-03 imp: .'www.utahhar.org/rulcs__ops_ pols/elhics opinions/op__99_ 0? htm!
the witness must speak to the lawyoi. As with any other witness
not under subpoena, an e>pert witness may choose not to
discuss the case With the lawyer in fact, the opposing patty or its
lawyer may ptopetly have asked the expeit not io discuss the
i ase with hie inquiring lawyer See Model Rule 3.4{f]
The ABA opinion also warns about attempts to induce an opposing witness to
mvea! confidences'
!L]olh fact witnesses and experts may be in possession of
confidences ol Ihe opposing party, ot work product of tfiat party's
lawyer about vv.mch it would he improper to inquire See
Anioiican Protection inswarice Co v. t/,GM Giand Hotel—at
Vt (;;,$, 748 1 2d 12P3. 1301 (.Mb. Or. 1984), holding that "A
corollary of hie attorney's duty not to reveal confidences of a
Cic-nt 'S the duly not to seek to cause a icther to do so." 1_
Using an cx pare contact to attempt to obtain information protected by the
physician patient privilege would violate UtEih Rules of Professional Conduct
"A.4(c) . 4.4 , and 8.4(d) Otfiei considerations arise when the physician's role
is to sppt ar as an expert witness; the Committee notes that an expert witness
may be prwy to opposing counsel's local theories and thought processes and
there may be little allotmation from that physician-expert that would not be
protects d hy the aootopnate confidential privileges.
In addition to Ihe concerns raised in ABA Opinion S3 378, it would also be
.•rip'opci for the attorney !c attempt to persuade the witness not to testify; 2 to
(: sohey or to creumvent the appropriate court rules concerning discovery and
evidence; 3 to ask a person other than a client to tefratn from voluntarily giving
io'evant information to ancthet party. 4 or use the ex parte contact in a way
that may tend to emhatrass. delay of burden the doctor 5 Overreaching by
counsel in the ways discussed above is prohibited by the ethics rules, as is
''irilai iMipiope: in'luenoe on the part ot niainliifs counsel
The mere possibility of misconduct by an attorney during an ex parte contact
w th a physician does not justify a blanket prof ibition on such ex parte
oor.lHots "I bus. it would not tie appreciate to assume that an c x parte interview
conducted by either plaintiff or defendant would be outside the bounds o"
proper discovery, 6 An attorney must conform to the rules of the court and
canicular rules of ( whence and disccvery m each case The coui may limit or
condition ox parte contacts, but as a mailer of professional ethics and the
nxistinq rules, there: is no bar to such ex pnite contacts Many states have
come lo the same opinion that attorneys for a defendant in a personal injury
case nave the right to interview plaintiffs treating physician ex pahe. 7
1 :.e attorneys involved in an ex parte ccntact of an onposing w.tness may
appropoately be concerned about the extent m" a phys'Cian-pauent privilege.
'b6/2(K)6 10.05 AM
l/SB EAC'C Opinion nb-rt^ http' w'ww'.titahbiii'.ore rules ops pels ethics opinions/op_99_()3 li'ml
'T'be natc-T: rm:i ercot c* that po." ece is caie'uliy defined m statute m e anc
court decas on and .s therefc;e. a matter tor legal interpretation t is not toe
function of this Commntee to offer legal advice regarding the extent cf the
privilege in situations 'where the question is a close one. the matter should be
addressed by the parties in ccrcert will' the court, applymp: anc icer.be r^les of
c:sccveo,' and e.icenoe.
Footnotes
1. ABA Corum On Ethics & Prof Responsibility, Formal Go 93-378 The
coinion also rcrt ,nc's attorneys that Pule 3.4 (bj prohibits ahcr eys fen
counseling] or ass s:mc_ re] a wtr ess lo testify falsely
7_. '/-, lawyer ^-ha'i mil on awhn'y costruct another party z aimess tc
evidence or unbiwhniy alter, destroy ot conceal a document oi ether mater,al
having potennul evidentiary value A lawyer shall not counsel ot assist another
person to do ;-wy such, act ' Utah Rules cf Professional Con.cuct 3_4(_aJ .
3. A lawyc-i sh.ai1 -,:! •,-- omc y disobey an cthigahou •.mrj^r the \des of a
t'ibuna! o.ot.u 1 ;m a^ cne". re;usa based on an asserheu teat "c valid
obfgation exists id 3.4_[cj
4, ''A lawyer sha'l not 'eoucst a person other than a chent 'o refrain from
voluntan'y giving relevant irfcrmation to another party uivehs •' i The person s
a relative or ether agen' c' a c eut and <2) The lawyer icascm.by heiieves iba:
the person s .n'emsis v.:ii net be adversely ahected horn c v -c. such
'-.formation ' Id 3 -[!_) .
b. "In representing a client, a lawyer shall not use means that have no
substanba! purpose other than to (.-mbatrass, delay, or bum'*, n a third person or
use methods of otda n eg ev.derce that violate the lega: r.p"ts ••:' such a
person ' id. 4 4
o. State ex tot. Stuiflebam • Apcelqaist, 694 S,W.?d 882 i'.'o. App. "eco).
P See. eg. Mich. Ethics Op. 60 (Dec 1980); Mich Eth.cs Op 177 (July
1958hvVash State Bar Ethics Op ojS iApnM962). VVash hta"e Ear Ethics
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